first draft of intro
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2 changed files with 36 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -2,13 +2,20 @@
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short={IDS},
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short={IDS},
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long={Intrusion Detection System}
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long={Intrusion Detection System}
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}
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}
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\DeclareAcronym{hids}{
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\DeclareAcronym{hids}{
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short={HIDS},
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short={HIDS},
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long={Host-Based Intrusion Detection System}
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long={Host-Based Intrusion Detection System}
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}
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}
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\DeclareAcronym{os}{
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\DeclareAcronym{os}{
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short={OS},
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short={OS},
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long={Operating System}
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long={Operating System}
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}
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}
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\DeclareAcronym{sci}{
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short={SCI},
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long={Side-Channel Information}
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}
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\DeclareAcronym{cpu}{
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short={CPU},
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long={Central Processing Unit}
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}
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@ -104,9 +104,35 @@ For the purpose of this study, we do not differentiate between Unix-based OSs an
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Of course, many methods have been proposed and implemented to detect or counter process list tampering.
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Of course, many methods have been proposed and implemented to detect or counter process list tampering.
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These methods --- although they leverage different mechanisms --- are all host-based.
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These methods --- although they leverage different mechanisms --- are all host-based.
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This create a circular dependency where the \ac{ids} rely on the host system to provide the very information leveraged to assess its integrity.
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This create a circular dependency where the \ac{ids} rely on the host system to provide the very information leveraged to assess its integrity.
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As rootkis providing process hiding remained a threat since their introduction, it is safe to assume that current countermesures --- and future ones based on similar technics --- do not provide adequate protection.
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In this situation, an attacker that succesfully compromises a machine can employ evasion technics that manipulate the data used for detection.
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As rootkis providing process hiding remained a threat since their introduction, it is safe to assume that current countermesures --- and future ones based on similar technics --- do not provide complete protection.
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% is it a bird? is it a plane? No its the good old power consumption!
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% is it a bird? is it a plane? No its the good old power consumption!
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One possible alternate method for detecting process list manipulation is using a secondary source of information to corroborate the process list.
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To avoid bypass, the secondary source must be independent from the \ac{os} and not require its cooperation to enable protection.
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However, the source must also provide information correlated with process presence and activity on the machine.
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\ac{sci} are compeling as the secondary source.
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As involuntary emissions, they are intrisecely independent from the origin system.
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No communication is required with the system to access these information.
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As physical by-product of the computation, they are hard to forge from an attacker point of view.
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A program can somewhat controle its computation intensity but it is difficult to precisely controle the generated emission and impossible to fully supress them.
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If the attacker wish to perform any computation on the compromised machine, it will result in some form of physical emission.
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The most common \ac{sci} leveraged for attack or defense is energy consumption.
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Due to its ease of capture, high reliability, large range of application, and good informative potential about the activity of the system.
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Of course, there are drawbacks to using power consumption as a source of information.
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First, the raw power consumption of a machine is not an actionable piece of information.
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A step of information mining --- for example pattern recognition, anomaly detection, or even a simple thresholding --- is always required to take a decision.
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Then, measuring true independent power consumption data require additional hardware.
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Although software estimations of power consumption are available, they bear the same issue as other host-based source of information.
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Finaly, the power consumption of a mchine only ontains a small subset of all information related to processes activity.
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A \ac{cpu} are capable or hundreds to thousands of millions operations per seconds.
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Each intruction triggers multiple consumptions patterns acrosses multiple components of the system.
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Although --- in theory --- the power consumption is a sum of all these sub-consumptions, the reality of measurement --- in terms of resolution, accuracy, and sampling rate --- make single-instruction measurement unrealistic at a global scale of the \ac{cpu}.
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Taking all these limitations into account, the power consumption of a machine --- and more specifically the global power consuption of its \ac{cpu} --- is a valuable complementary source of information.
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The correlation between a list of processes and the power consumption can enable the detection of process list tampering, evidence of malware activity.
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% Thank you king of sweden. No it was nothing you are welcome. Ok get home safe now. Byeeee.
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% Thank you king of sweden. No it was nothing you are welcome. Ok get home safe now. Byeeee.
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