first round clemence comments

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Arthur Grisel-Davy 2023-10-02 14:32:49 -04:00
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\chapter{Conclusion}
The problem of leveraging power side-channel analysis to defend embedded systems presents unique capabilities.
Contrary to current common \gls{ids} techniques, physics-based security is not built on purpose-made actionable data.
Contrary to current common \glspl{ids} techniques, physics-based security is not built on purpose-made actionable data.
The very nature of the input information sets this technique aside.
Power consumption is closely related to instruction execution and makes it a good proxy variable for machine activity.
Moreover, power is easy and cheap to measure reliably at a high sampling rate, enabling analysis of any machine consuming electricity.
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To enable further analysis, a set of algorithms is required for both runtime online analysis and offline monitoring of specific activity.
The full range of capabilities remains to be discovered.
Successful runtime monitoring enables the detection of activity policy violations, anomalous activity detection, machine failure detection or distributed attacks.
On the other hand, pre-OS monitoring enables the detection of boot process violation at a level where common \gls{ids} are not enabled yet.
On the other hand, pre-OS monitoring enables the detection of boot process violation at a level where common \glspl{ids} are not enabled yet.
These are just some of the possible applications of this technology, with many more to be discovered.
This proposal presents some problems to study that enable the development of physics-based security.