first round clemence comments
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\chapter{Conclusion}
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The problem of leveraging power side-channel analysis to defend embedded systems presents unique capabilities.
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Contrary to current common \gls{ids} techniques, physics-based security is not built on purpose-made actionable data.
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Contrary to current common \glspl{ids} techniques, physics-based security is not built on purpose-made actionable data.
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The very nature of the input information sets this technique aside.
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Power consumption is closely related to instruction execution and makes it a good proxy variable for machine activity.
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Moreover, power is easy and cheap to measure reliably at a high sampling rate, enabling analysis of any machine consuming electricity.
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To enable further analysis, a set of algorithms is required for both runtime online analysis and offline monitoring of specific activity.
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The full range of capabilities remains to be discovered.
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Successful runtime monitoring enables the detection of activity policy violations, anomalous activity detection, machine failure detection or distributed attacks.
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On the other hand, pre-OS monitoring enables the detection of boot process violation at a level where common \gls{ids} are not enabled yet.
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On the other hand, pre-OS monitoring enables the detection of boot process violation at a level where common \glspl{ids} are not enabled yet.
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These are just some of the possible applications of this technology, with many more to be discovered.
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This proposal presents some problems to study that enable the development of physics-based security.
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