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first round clemence comments

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Arthur Grisel-Davy 2023-10-02 14:32:49 -04:00
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PhD/research_proposal/frontpages.tex
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@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ This design makes the result of the detection trustworthy only when the target i
This observation leads to the conclusion that we cannot entrust machines to assess their own integrity.
To remain trustworthy, the IDS must be independent of the target and require no cooperation to perform the detection.
The main challenge with such a system is collecting relevant data.
The main example of such a system are Network-based IDS (NIDS).
NIDS exhibit complete independence, but their input data --- network communication from the machine --- is only relevant for a small subset of attacks.
The main example of such a system are Network-based IDSs (NIDSs).
NIDSs exhibit complete independence, but their input data --- network communication from the machine --- is only relevant for a small subset of attacks.
This proposal describe another family of IDSs called physics-based IDS that leverages side-channel information.
This proposal describes another family of IDSs called physics-based IDS --- also called side-channel-based IDS --- that leverages side-channel information.
Side-channel information is a perfect candidate for intrusion detection as it is, by definition, an involuntary emission from the target.
Collecting side-channel information requires no communication with the machine to protect.
Moreover, if chosen adequately, side-channel information can provide insight into all activities performed by the machine.