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first round clemence comments

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Arthur Grisel-Davy 2023-10-02 14:32:49 -04:00
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PhD/research_proposal/pastwork.tex
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ As powerful as computers can be, their computing power remains useless if they a
Communication is as essential as computing power in a data centre with hundreds of machines.
The failure of a network switch can have devastating consequences for the data centre operations.
Every minute of downtime costs the data centre and its clients a fortune and must be prevented.
\gls{hids} are often not a perfect solution for network switches.
\glspl{hids} are often not a perfect solution for network switches.
Their \gls{os} typically do not support additional software installation and may not propose built-in \gls{ids} capabilities.
When they do, the security solutions may be weak or rapidly out of date and fail to protect against attacks such as firmware modification~\cite{cisco_trust,thomson_2019} and bypassing secure boot-up~\cite{Cui2013WhenFM, hau_2015}.
They also fail to offer effective runtime monitoring through auditing and verifying log entries~\cite{koch2010security}.
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ They also fail to offer effective runtime monitoring through auditing and verify
For these reasons, network switches are prime candidates for side-channel security.
Installing a side-channel monitoring system is often minimally invasive and can even be performed without downtime if the machine supports redundant power supplies.
The project aimed to leverage side-channel analysis to detect anomalous activities that can be related to attacks on a network switch.
The goal is not to create a complete \gls{ids} suite from physics-based security but to offer a complementary detection mechanism for the cases where traditional \gls{ids} fail.
The goal is not to create a complete \gls{ids} suite from physics-based security but to offer a complementary detection mechanism for the cases where traditional \glspl{ids} fail.
\subsection{Attack Scenario}
@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ All these methods yield good results for the detection of abnormal firmware.
\label{fig:eet1_firmware}
\end{figure}
This first exploration of the capabilities of physics-based \gls{ids} lead to the publication of an article \cite{eet1_mlcs} at the workshop on Machine Learning for Cyber Security at the ECML-PKDD conference.
This first exploration of the capabilities of physics-based \glspl{ids} lead to the publication of an article \cite{eet1_mlcs} at the workshop on Machine Learning for Cyber Security at the ECML-PKDD conference.
\newpage
\section{xPSU}\label{sec:xpsu}
@ -120,8 +120,7 @@ The capture mechanism consisted of a shunt resistor for generating the voltage d
The xPSU system measures and analyses the power consumption without communicating with the host device to ensure independence.
The xPSU was an early proof of concept, and all the components could not fit in the \gls{psu}.
The fan of the \gls{psu} was moved outside of the enclosure, modifying the form factor of the \gls{psu}.
For this reason, the xPSU was not a perfect \textit{drop-in} replacement of a regular power supply, but the final form factor was encouraging.
A more compact form factor is possible with a better design of the capture system and a more appropriate choice of components.
For this reason, the xPSU was not a perfect \textit{drop-in} replacement of a regular power supply, but the final form factor was encouraging. A more compact form factor is possible with a better design of the capture system and a more appropriate choice of components.
\begin{figure}
\centering