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@ -2058,6 +2058,7 @@ series = {UbiComp '10}
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year={2015},
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year={2015},
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publisher={Springer}
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publisher={Springer}
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}
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}
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@inproceedings{van2018side,
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@inproceedings{van2018side,
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title={Side-channel based intrusion detection for industrial control systems},
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title={Side-channel based intrusion detection for industrial control systems},
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author={Van Aubel, Pol and Papagiannopoulos, Kostas and Chmielewski, {\L}ukasz and Doerr, Christian},
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author={Van Aubel, Pol and Papagiannopoulos, Kostas and Chmielewski, {\L}ukasz and Doerr, Christian},
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@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ To enable further analysis, a set of algorithms is required for both runtime onl
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The full range of capabilities remains to be discovered.
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The full range of capabilities remains to be discovered.
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Successful runtime monitoring enables the detection of activity policy violations, anomalous activity detection, machine failure detection or distributed attacks.
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Successful runtime monitoring enables the detection of activity policy violations, anomalous activity detection, machine failure detection or distributed attacks.
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On the other hand, pre-OS monitoring enables the detection of boot process violation at a level where common \glspl{ids} are not enabled yet.
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On the other hand, pre-OS monitoring enables the detection of boot process violation at a level where common \glspl{ids} are not enabled yet.
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These are just some of the possible applications of this technology, with many more to be discovered.
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These are just some of the possible applications of this technology, with many more to discovered.
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This proposal presents some problems to study that enable the development of physics-based security.
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@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ Supervisor: \> Sebastian Fischmeister \\
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\begin{center}\textbf{Abstract}\end{center}
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\begin{center}\textbf{Abstract}\end{center}
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Most current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) share the flaw of requiring the cooperation of the system to protect --- the target.
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Most current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) share the flaw of requiring the cooperation of the system to protect --- the target.
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Whether the IDS is a software or hardware component, they don't perform the detection independently and require the target to execute a programm, use a component, or transmit resuts.
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Whether the IDS is a software or hardware component, it does not perform the detection independently and requires the target to execute a programm, use a component, or transmit resuts.
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In the case of a compromised target, this critical flaw allows attackers to avoid detection by forging input data, forging detection results, or bypassing the IDS altogether.
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In the case of a compromised target, this critical flaw allows attackers to avoid detection by forging input data, forging detection results, or bypassing the IDS altogether.
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This design makes the result of the detection trustworthy only when the target is not compromised.
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This design makes the result of the detection trustworthy only when the target is not compromised.
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This observation leads to the conclusion that we cannot entrust machines to assess their own integrity.
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This observation leads to the conclusion that we cannot entrust machines to assess their own integrity.
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To remain trustworthy, the IDS must be independent of the target and require no cooperation to perform the detection.
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To remain trustworthy, the IDS must be independent of the target and not require cooperation to perform the detection.
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The main challenge with such a system is collecting relevant data.
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The main challenge with such a system is collecting relevant data.
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The main example of such a system are Network-based IDSs (NIDSs).
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The main example of such a system are Network-based IDSs (NIDSs).
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NIDSs exhibit complete independence, but their input data --- network communication from the machine --- is only relevant for a small subset of attacks.
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NIDSs exhibit complete independence, but their input data --- network communication from the machine --- is only relevant for a small subset of attacks.
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
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A wide variety of solutions are available to protect embedded.
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A wide variety of solutions are available to protect embedded systems.
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No solution can claim to protect against all possible attacks, and multiple layers of prevention, detection, and mitigation mechanisms are often required to protect a system as best as possible.
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No solution can claim to protect against all possible attacks, and multiple layers of prevention, detection, and mitigation mechanisms are often required to protect a system as best as possible.
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Each solution presents different domains of application, requirements, and capabilities that are important to understand to reduce the attack surface.
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Each solution presents different domains of application, requirements, and capabilities that are important to understand to reduce the attack surface.
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@ -25,26 +25,26 @@ If the \gls{ids} only considers local resources (e.g. CPU load, RAM data, disks
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\glspl{hids} have access to relevant local data, but they require to install software on the target --- either for collection only or for local analysis --- or dedicated components in communication with the target.
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\glspl{hids} have access to relevant local data, but they require to install software on the target --- either for collection only or for local analysis --- or dedicated components in communication with the target.
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This requirement represents a flaw for two main reasons.
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This requirement represents a flaw for two main reasons.
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First, the host machine may be compromised, allowing the attacker to bypass the detection by feeding forged data to the \gls{ids}, shutting it down, or forging the detection result.
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First, the host machine may be compromised, allowing the attacker to bypass the detection by feeding forged data to the \gls{ids}, shutting it down, or forging the detection result.
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Second, the operation of the \gls{hids} may interfere with the critical operation of the system (for example, if the \gls{hids} misbehave and block other operations).
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Second, the operation of the \gls{hids} may interfere with the critical operation of the system (for example, if the \gls{hids} misbehaves and blocks other operations).
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For these reasons, \gls{hids} may be challenging to implement on a wide range of embedded systems and lack the reliability of an external solution.
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For these reasons, \glspl{hids} may be challenging to implement on a wide range of embedded systems and lack the reliability of an external solution.
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One other main class of \gls{ids} takes a different approach to solving some of these issues.
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One other main class of \gls{ids} takes a different approach to solving some of these issues.
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\gls{nids} consider the communication between machines in a network to detect intrusions.
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\glspl{nids} consider the communication between machines in a network to detect intrusions.
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This solution does not require installing individual software on each machine and can detect network-level intrusions.
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This solution does not require installing individual software on each machine and can detect network-level intrusions.
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However, \gls{nids} present their own drawbacks.
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However, \glspl{nids} present their own drawbacks.
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First, machine-specific attacks can remain undetected as only network information is accessible.
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First, machine-specific attacks can remain undetected as only network information is accessible.
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Then, they require the installation of dedicated equipment to collect network traffic.
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Then, they require the installation of dedicated equipment to collect network traffic.
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Finally, modern traffic encryption practices will limit the \gls{nids} to sender-receiver pattern analysis unless traffic flows unencrypted, which can raise privacy issues.
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Finally, modern traffic encryption practices will limit \glspl{nids} to sender-receiver pattern analysis unless traffic flows unencrypted, which can raise privacy issues.
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The current \gls{ids} scene appears to present a tradeoff between the granularity of detection and isolation from the protected machine.
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The current \gls{ids} scene appears to present a tradeoff between the granularity of detection and isolation from the protected machine.
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What about the case of protecting a machine against a local intrusion without the possibility of installing additional software?
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What about the case of protecting a machine against a local intrusion without the possibility of installing additional software?
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How can an \gls{ids} protect a machine against attackers bypassing the secure boot verification and booting a completely different \gls{os}?
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How can an \gls{ids} protect a machine against attackers bypassing the secure boot verification and booting a completely different \gls{os}?
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Following the discovery of a vulnerability on a \gls{scs}, how can the detection mechanism evolve without requiring the re-certification of the whole system?
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Following the discovery of a vulnerability on a \gls{scs}, how can the detection mechanism evolve without requiring the recertification of the whole system?
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These use cases can seem niche, but they represent a reality for many purpose-built embedded systems with minimal \gls{os}.
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These use cases can seem niche, but they represent a reality for many purpose-built embedded systems with minimal \gls{os}.
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Systems like network switches, \gls{rtu}, \gls{wap} rarely allow additional software installation and yet perform critical tasks.
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Systems like network switches, \gls{rtu}, \gls{wap} rarely allow additional software installation and yet perform critical tasks.
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In these cases, neither local resources nor network information can be leveraged for local attack detection.
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In these cases, neither local resources nor network information can be leveraged for local attack detection.
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Moreover, any industry that relies on \gls{scs} have strict regulations (e.g. DO-178C for aerospace systems in Canada, ISO 26262 for automotive system, ISO 16142 for medical devices) that guarantee the safety of every equipment.
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Moreover, any industry that relies on \gls{scs} have strict regulations (e.g. DO-178C for aerospace systems in Canada, ISO 26262 for automotive system, ISO 16142 for medical devices) that guarantee the safety of every equipment.
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Modifying an existing system to add intrusion detection capabilities is expensive as it requires the re-validation of the whole system.
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Modifying an existing system to add intrusion detection capabilities is expensive as it requires the revalidation of the whole system.
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A third under-exploited source of information for embedded systems activity is the side-channels.
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A third under-exploited source of information for embedded systems activity is the side-channels.
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The side-channels are all the physical emissions that a machine involuntarily generates.
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The side-channels are all the physical emissions that a machine involuntarily generates.
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@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ For example, the sound of a fan, the temperature of a CPU, or the power consumpt
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\begin{figure}[H]
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\begin{figure}[H]
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\centering
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{images/side_channel}
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\includegraphics[width=0.95\linewidth]{images/side_channel.pdf}
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\caption{Main side-channels from a typical embedded systems.}
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\caption{Main side-channels from a typical embedded systems.}
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\label{fig:side_channel}
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\label{fig:side_channel}
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\end{figure}
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\end{figure}
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@ -70,16 +70,17 @@ This proposal is organized as follows: Section~\ref{sec:related-work} presents a
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The idea of side-channel-based analysis traces back to the seminal work by Paul C. Kocher.
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The idea of side-channel-based analysis traces back to the seminal work by Paul C. Kocher.
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He introduced \gls{dpa} to find secret keys used by cryptographic protocols in tamper-resistant devices~\cite{kocher1999differential}.
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He introduced \gls{dpa} to find secret keys used by cryptographic protocols in tamper-resistant devices~\cite{kocher1999differential}.
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This led to a field of research focusing on side-channel analysis that has grown ever since.
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This led to a field of research focusing on side-channel analysis that has grown ever since.
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A wide variety of side-channels have since been leveraged to recover information from a system such as power consumption \cite{brier2004correlation,mangard2008power}, electromagnetic fields~\cite{sayakkara2019survey}, acoustic emanations~\cite{7479068, alevi2015keyboard}, thermal dissipations~\cite{9727162} or, on the non-physical side, cache~\cite{page2003defending}.
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A wide variety of side-channels have since been leveraged to recover information from a system such as power consumption \cite{brier2004correlation,mangard2008power}, electromagnetic fields~\cite{sayakkara2019survey}, acoustic emanations~\cite{7479068, halevi2015keyboard}, thermal dissipations~\cite{9727162} or, on the non-physical side, cache~\cite{page2003defending}.
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Among them, power consumption is the most common and widely studied side-channel because of its numerous advantages.
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Among them, power consumption is the most common and widely studied side-channel because of its numerous advantages.
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Power consumption leaks information about the activity of an embedded system with little inertia --- i.e., it can transmit high-frequency information contrary to thermal ---, is easy to measure with low-cost equipment at specific points in a machine --- contrary to electromagnetic fields or sound --- and is guaranteed to be present in any system.
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Power consumption leaks information about the activity of an embedded system with little inertia --- i.e., it can transmit high-frequency information contrary to thermal ---, is easy to reliably measure with low-cost equipment --- contrary to electromagnetic fields or sound --- and is guaranteed to be present in any system.
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This combination of properties allows for a granular detection of a system activity, even at the instruction level.
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This combination of properties allows for a granular detection of a system activity, even at the instruction level.
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%Quisquater et al.~\cite{quisquater2002automatic} present an approach to identify instructions with the use of self-organizing maps, power analysis and analysis of electromagnetic traces.\agd{this citation comes out of nowhere}
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%Quisquater et al.~\cite{quisquater2002automatic} present an approach to identify instructions with the use of self-organizing maps, power analysis and analysis of electromagnetic traces.\agd{this citation comes out of nowhere}
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%Eisenbarth et al.~\cite{eisenbarth2010building} propose a methodology for recovering the instruction flow of microcontrollers using its power consumption.\agd{this citation comes out of nowhere}
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%Eisenbarth et al.~\cite{eisenbarth2010building} propose a methodology for recovering the instruction flow of microcontrollers using its power consumption.\agd{this citation comes out of nowhere}
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Even though the information potential of side-channel analysis enables powerful attacks, it also enables defensive capabilities.
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Even though the information-gathering capability of side-channel analysis enables powerful attacks, it also enables defensive capabilities.
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Zhai et al.~\cite{zhai2015method} propose a self-organizing maps approach that uses features extracted from an embedded processor to detect abnormal behaviour in embedded devices.
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Zhai et al.~\cite{zhai2015method} propose a self-organizing maps approach that uses features extracted from an embedded processor to detect abnormal behaviour in embedded devices.
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Different teams at Georgia Tech University leveraged power and electromagnetic backscattering \cite{8701559, jorgensen2022efficient} to detect hardware trojans and counterfeit integrated circuits.
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Different teams at Georgia Tech University leveraged power and electromagnetic backscattering \cite{8701559, jorgensen2022efficient} to detect hardware trojans and counterfeit integrated circuits.
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Due to its non-intrusive and architecture-agnostic nature, power fingerprinting has a wide range of applications from energy production systems \cite{6378346}, Software Defined Radio compliance assessments \cite{5379826}, or applications activity on mobile devices \cite{8057232}.
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Due to its non-intrusive and architecture-agnostic nature, power fingerprinting has a wide range of applications from energy production systems \cite{6378346}, Software Defined Radio compliance assessments \cite{5379826}, or applications activity on mobile devices \cite{8057232}.
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@ -90,12 +91,12 @@ In this work, they use the power consumption of a given embedded system to ident
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The team builds on their previous technique and presents a new one~\cite{Moreno2018} using the power consumption of embedded systems for non-intrusive online run-time monitoring through anomaly detection.
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The team builds on their previous technique and presents a new one~\cite{Moreno2018} using the power consumption of embedded systems for non-intrusive online run-time monitoring through anomaly detection.
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They use a signals and systems analysis approach to identify anomalies using the power consumption of a system and showcase this by identifying buffer overflow attacks on their system.
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They use a signals and systems analysis approach to identify anomalies using the power consumption of a system and showcase this by identifying buffer overflow attacks on their system.
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Msgna et al.~\cite{msgna2014verifying} propose a technique for using the instruction-level power consumption of a system to verify the integrity of the software components of a system with no prior knowledge of the software code.
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Msgna et al.~\cite{msgna2014verifying} propose a technique for using the instruction-level power consumption of a system to verify the integrity of the software components of a system with no prior knowledge of the software code.
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In~\cite{kur2009improving}, Kur et al. perform power analysis of smart cards based on the JavaCard platform to help identify vulnerable operations, obtain bytecode instruction information, and also propose a framework to replace vulnerable operations with safe alternatives.\\
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In~\cite{kur2009improving}, Kur et al. perform power analysis of smart cards based on the JavaCard platform to help identify vulnerable operations, obtain bytecode instruction information, and also propose a framework to replace vulnerable operations with safe alternatives.
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Side-channel information's non-intrusiveness and difficult-to-forge nature make it an ideal input for \gls{ids} systems.
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Side-channel information's non-intrusiveness and difficult-to-forge nature makes it an ideal input for \glspl{ids}.
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Van Aubel et al.~\cite{van2018side} proposed using electromagnetic information to protect \gls{ics} by detecting changes in software flow.
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Van Aubel et al.~\cite{van2018side} proposed using electromagnetic information to protect \glspl{ics} by detecting changes in software flow.
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Xun et al.~\cite{10016748} use the voltage signal of a vehicle CAN bus to detect anomalies without extensive documentation from the manufacturer.
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Xun et al.~\cite{10016748} use the voltage signal of a vehicle CAN bus to detect anomalies without extensive documentation from the manufacturer.
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On a different kind of embedded systems, Liang et al. propose a framework to leverage side-channel information in additive manufacturing where traditional \gls{ids} would fail.
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On a different kind of embedded systems, Liang et al. propose a framework to leverage side-channel information in additive manufacturing where traditional \glspl{ids} would fail.
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In more recent literature, there is a trend towards using \gls{ml} for side-channel analysis to enhance the security of systems.
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In more recent literature, there is a trend towards using \gls{ml} for side-channel analysis to enhance the security of systems.
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Michele Giovanni Calvi~\cite{calvi2019runtime} offers a solution for run-time monitoring of an entire cyber-physical system treated as a black box.
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Michele Giovanni Calvi~\cite{calvi2019runtime} offers a solution for run-time monitoring of an entire cyber-physical system treated as a black box.
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\usepackage{multirow}
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\usepackage{multirow}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage[acronyms]{glossaries} % Exception to the rule of hyperref being the last add-on package
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\usepackage[acronyms]{glossaries} % Exception to the rule of hyperref being the last add-on package
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\glsdisablehyper
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% If glossaries-extra is not in your LaTeX distribution, get it from CTAN (http://ctan.org/pkg/glossaries-extra),
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% If glossaries-extra is not in your LaTeX distribution, get it from CTAN (http://ctan.org/pkg/glossaries-extra),
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% although it's supposed to be in both the TeX Live and MikTeX distributions. There are also documentation and
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% although it's supposed to be in both the TeX Live and MikTeX distributions. There are also documentation and
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% installation instructions there.
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% installation instructions there.
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\section{Winter 2024}
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\section{Winter 2024}
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Winter 2024 will be dedicated to designing and evaluating the single-source multi-measure system.
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Winter 2024 will be dedicated to designing and evaluating the single-source multi-measure system.
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This work's challenge is enabling the processing of multi-variate time series to yield better results.
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This work's challenge is enabling the processing of multi-variate time series to yield better results.
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The system's performances will be put in perspective with the capabilities of the DSD (single-source single-measure).
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The system's performances will be put in perspective with the capabilities of the \gls{dsd} (single-source single-measure).
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A series of experiments will also provide a complementary evaluation of the performances of these new techniques.
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A series of experiments will also provide a complementary evaluation of the performances of these new techniques.
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The experiments will be collected in a paper with a publication aimed at the next term.
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The experiments will be collected in a paper with a publication aimed at the next term.
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