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Arthur Grisel-Davy 2023-09-29 07:56:09 -04:00
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PhD/research_proposal/frontpages.tex
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@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. The decision of
\noindent
\begin{tabbing}
Internal-External Member: \= \kill % using longest text to define tab length
Internal Mamber: \> Mark Crowley \\
\> Professor, Dept. Electrical and Computer Engineering\\
Internal-External Member: \> Diogo Barradas\\
\> Assistant Professor, Cheriton School of Computer Science\\
\> University of Waterloo \\
\end{tabbing}
\bigskip
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ Internal Member: \> Catherine Gebotys\\
\noindent
\begin{tabbing}
Internal-External Member: \= \kill % using longest text to define tab length
Internal Member: \> Patrick Mitran\\
Internal Member: \> Mark Crowley\\
\> Professor, Dept. Electrical and Computer Engineering\\
\> University of Waterloo \\
\end{tabbing}
@ -108,8 +108,24 @@ Supervisor: \> Sebastian Fischmeister \\
\addcontentsline{toc}{chapter}{Abstract}
\begin{center}\textbf{Abstract}\end{center}
This is the abstract.
Most current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) share the flaw of requiring the cooperation of the system to protect.
Whether the IDS is a software or hardware component, they don't perform the detection independently and require the system to protect to execute or call them.
This is a critical flaw as it allows attackers to avoid detection by forging input data, forging detection results, or bypassing the IDS altogether.
This is particularly problematic for firmware-level attacks that enable control of the most critical components of the machine, making the attacks especially difficult to detect, mitigate, and remove.
This observation leads to the conclusion that we cannot entrust machines to assess their integrity.
To remain trustworthy, the IDS must be independent of the machine to protect and require no cooperation to perform the detection.
The main challenge with such a system is getting access to relevant data.
Network-based IDS fit in this category and exhibit complete independence, but their input data --- network communication from the machine --- is only relevant for a small subset of attacks.
This thesis proposes to explore another family of IDSs called physics-based IDS that leverages side-channel information.
Side-channel information is a perfect candidate for intrusion detection.
The generation of this information is, by definition, involuntary.
Hence, their measurement requires no communication with the machine to protect.
Moreover, if chosen carefully, side-channel information can provide insight into all activities performed by the machine.
Finally, side-channel information remains practical to measure on virtually any embedded system, providing a solution that is not only theoretical but also applicable in the real world.
This proposal describes the exploratory work already achieved in the domain of physics-based IDS and outlines the main problems to study to evaluate the potential of this technology.
\cleardoublepage
\phantomsection % allows hyperref to link to the correct page