sync CPI scholarship application

scolarship_CPI/research.typ

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#import "@preview/acrostiche:0.3.0": *
+
+#set page("us-letter",
+  header: [
+      #set text(8pt)
+      #smallcaps[Arthur Grisel-Davy]
+      #h(1fr) _CPI Scholarship Application_
+  ],
+
+)
+
+#init-acronyms((
+  "IDS": ("Intrusion Detection System"),
+))
+
+#let cn = {text(fill:purple, weight:"bold")[#smallcaps[\[citation needed\]]]}
+
+#set par(
+  first-line-indent: 1em,
+  justify: true,
+)
+
+#text(weight: "bold", size: 2em)[Areas of Research]
+#v(0pt)
+#line(length:100%, stroke: 2pt)
+
+My research projects, as a Ph.D. student, all revolve around the concepts of enforcing security policies or detecting abnormal behavior using the power consumption of an embedded system.
+The power consumption, like other side-channel emmissions --- noise, temperature, or timing information for example---, are, from a computation point of view, a necessary but useless by-product that the machine has to deal with.
+However, for a few decades now, researchers and have found ways to leverage these seemingly useless information channels to extract insights about the machine states and activities.
+Although primalarily leveraging these information to design attacks, the research on side-channel analysis also proposes to consider them as a source of information to power defense mechanismes with their own intrisec characteristics.
+These mechanisms require the use or developement of processing algorithm to overcome the non-actionable nature of raw time series and extract the information embedded in the collected data.
+My projects focuses on exploring the applicability of side-channel (or physics-based) #acr("IDS") through the developement of processing algorithms and decision models.
+
+= Boot Process Verification
+The boot sequence of a machine is a critical state for the machine security.
+The bootloader and firmware that executes during this sequence controles the lowest level of software that sets important security parameter.
+Moreover, this is a particularily vulnerable sequence as no host-based #acr("IDS") is running.
+There are hardware-based mechanisms, often leveraging cryptographic sugnatures, that strive to prevent firmware tampering, but studies illustrated the possibility to bypass them #cn.