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@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ This section elaborates on some important aspects of this study.
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We use a hardware device referred to as the capture box @hidden placed in series with the primary power cable of the target device.
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We use a hardware device referred to as the capture box @hidden placed in series with the primary power cable of the target device.
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The technology for measuring the current differs depending on the capture box's version.
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The technology for measuring the current differs depending on the capture box's version.
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For test cases 0 and 3, the box's shunt resistor generates a voltage drop representative of the global power consumption of the machine.
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For test cases 0 and 3, the box's shunt resistor generates a voltage drop representative of the global power consumption of the machine.
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For test case 1 and 2, a Hall effect sensor returns a voltage proportional to the current.
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For test cases 1 and 2, a Hall effect sensor returns a voltage proportional to the current.
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For both versions, the voltage value is sampled at 10 KSPS.
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For both versions, the voltage value is sampled at 10 KSPS.
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These samples are packaged in small fixed-size chunks and sent to a data aggregation server on a private #acr("VLAN").
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These samples are packaged in small fixed-size chunks and sent to a data aggregation server on a private #acr("VLAN").
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The data aggregation server is responsible for gathering data from all of our capture boxes and sending it via a #acr("VPN") tunnel to a storage server.
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The data aggregation server is responsible for gathering data from all of our capture boxes and sending it via a #acr("VPN") tunnel to a storage server.
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@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ The final step of the detection is to store all the boot sequences under the sam
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// The complete dataset corresponding to this experiment is available online @dataset.
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// The complete dataset corresponding to this experiment is available online @dataset.
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== Support for Online Training<online>
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== Support for Online Training<online>
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In order for the #acr("BPV") to integrate in a realistic environment, the training procedure takes the rareness of the boot-up event into account.
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In order to integrate the #acr("BPV") in a realistic environment, the training procedure takes the rareness of the boot-up event into account.
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Once the measurement device is set up on the machine to protect, the streaming time series representing the power consumption serves as input for the boot-up detection algorithm (see @sds).
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Once the measurement device is set up on the machine to protect, the streaming time series representing the power consumption serves as input for the boot-up detection algorithm (see @sds).
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Each boot-up event is extracted and added to a dataset of boot-up traces.
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Each boot-up event is extracted and added to a dataset of boot-up traces.
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Once the dataset reaches the expected number of samples, the #acr("BPV") computes the threshold and is ready for validation of the next boot-up.
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Once the dataset reaches the expected number of samples, the #acr("BPV") computes the threshold and is ready for validation of the next boot-up.
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@ -657,3 +657,4 @@ On a per-machine basis, anomaly generation can enhance the training set without
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Finally, deploying this technology to production networking equipment requires minimal downtime and hardware intrusion, and it is applicable to clientless equipment.
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Finally, deploying this technology to production networking equipment requires minimal downtime and hardware intrusion, and it is applicable to clientless equipment.
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This study illustrates the potential of independent, side-channel-based #acr("IDS") for the detection of low-level attacks that can compromise machines even before the operating system gets loaded.
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This study illustrates the potential of independent, side-channel-based #acr("IDS") for the detection of low-level attacks that can compromise machines even before the operating system gets loaded.
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