add attacker model
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@ -149,10 +149,59 @@ The nature of the divergence can further inform about the nature of the tamperin
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\section{Related Work}
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\subsection{Evasion Technics}
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% Evasion technics
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\subsection{Countermeasures}
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% HIDS countermeasures
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% Present the current technics for detecting process list tampering.
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% Point out that they are all host-based
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\subsection{Side-Channel Correlation}
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% Usage of side-channel for correlating system's state
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%
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\section{Problem Statement}
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The main problem that this study proposes to tack can be described as follows:
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\begin{center}
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Given the list of processes and their state and the power consumption of the \ac{cpu} over the same time periode, identify any tampering of the process list.
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\end{center}
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The list of processes over time $P = \{p_0,p_1\dots,p_{n-1}\}$ is a nested data object where each item $p_i$ contains all listed processes at timestamp $i$ named the \ac{ilp}.
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Each \ac{ilp} contains the name and state of each process present on the machine at a point in time.
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From capture to utilization in the prediction model, the process list $P$ undergo a number of transformation to reorganise the information for learning.
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See Section~\ref{sec:preprocessing} for technical details about the process list processing.
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The power consumption trace --- also named power trace --- is a univariate time series representing the measured power consumption of the \ac{cpu} over time.
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\subsection{Attacker Model}
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% Capabilities
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This study assumes a powerfull attacker with complete remote access to the monitored machine.
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We suppose that the attacker previously established remote access and can use this access at will and without risking detection.
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For example, the attacker could have recovered legitimate credentials for a local account on the machine.
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Moreover, the attacker is assumed to enjoy unrestricted access to the machine with the highest priviledge level.
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No operation on the machine is impossible to the attacker.
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The only limitation of the attacker is pysical access to the power measurement system.
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This mechanism may be additional hardware installed in a machine or built-in by the manufacturer.
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In any case, the attacker does not have access to the internal components responsible for measuring, processing, or sending the power consumption to the verification machine.
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However, the attacker can gain access to other components of the machine.
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For example, it is expected that the attacker can attack storage devices and boot a different \ac{os} than expected.
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% Goals
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The goal of the attacker is outside the scope of this study.
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The only expected intention of the attacker is to remain stealthy against \ac{ids}.
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To acieve stealth, the attacker will employ evasion technics to hide or masquerade its malicious processes using any method available to them.
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% Knowledge: The attacker may know about the monitoring system.
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This study assumes that teh attacker is aware that the proposed defense mechanism in installed on the machine.
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There is no part of the proposed approach that should remain secret to achieve its full potential.
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\section{Proposed Approach}
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\section{Case Studies}
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