#import "@preview/acrostiche:0.3.0": * #set page("us-letter", header: [ #set text(8pt) #smallcaps[Arthur Grisel-Davy] #h(1fr) _CPI Scholarship Application_ ], ) #init-acronyms(( "IDS": ("Intrusion Detection System"), )) #let cn = {text(fill:purple, weight:"bold")[#smallcaps[\[citation needed\]]]} #set par( first-line-indent: 1em, justify: true, ) #text(weight: "bold", size: 2em)[Areas of Research] #v(0pt) #line(length:100%, stroke: 2pt) My research projects, as a Ph.D. student, all revolve around the concepts of enforcing security policies or detecting abnormal behavior using the power consumption of an embedded system. The power consumption, like other side-channel emmissions --- noise, temperature, or timing information for example---, are, from a computation point of view, a necessary but useless by-product that the machine has to deal with. However, for a few decades now, researchers and have found ways to leverage these seemingly useless information channels to extract insights about the machine states and activities. Although primalarily leveraging these information to design attacks, the research on side-channel analysis also proposes to consider them as a source of information to power defense mechanismes with their own intrisec characteristics. These mechanisms require the use or developement of processing algorithm to overcome the non-actionable nature of raw time series and extract the information embedded in the collected data. My projects focuses on exploring the applicability of side-channel (or physics-based) #acr("IDS") through the developement of processing algorithms and decision models. = Boot Process Verification The boot sequence of a machine is a critical state for the machine security. The bootloader and firmware that executes during this sequence controles the lowest level of software that sets important security parameter. Moreover, this is a particularily vulnerable sequence as no host-based #acr("IDS") is running. There are hardware-based mechanisms, often leveraging cryptographic sugnatures, that strive to prevent firmware tampering, but studies illustrated the possibility to bypass them #cn.